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Tribunal Jurisdiction over Charter Remedies: Now You See It,
Now You Don't
Steve Coughlan* •
The Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Conway (reported ante p. 201) simplifies
the test for deciding whether an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to grant
Charter remedies. At least in principle, it heralds a broader approach to allowing
litigants to seek such remedies at the earlier stage of a proceeding, rather than
waiting for a review before a court or pursuing a parallel action. The attitude
behind Conway signals a greater willingness to allow administrative tribunals to
grant Charter remedies.
The test on the key question of whether a tribunal has jurisdiction over a particular remedy is still essentially the same: discerning legislative intent, as illustrated
by factors like the tribunal's statutory mandate, structure and function. However,
in the past one would have been undertaking this analysis to decide whether
jurisdiction over a particular remedy has been given. Under the Conway approach, it will already have been determined that the tribunal has Charter jurisdiction generally, and so the analysis of legislative intent will be aimed at deciding whether jurisdiction over a particular remedy has been removed. This might
lead to different conclusions, at least in close cases.
However (and surprisingly), there is also some reason to fear that Conway could
lead to a diminution of Charter jurisdiction among administrative tribunals. This
fear stems not from the approach articulated in Conway, but from its application
on the facts of the case.
Think for a moment about the general question of whether a decision maker has
jurisdiction over a particular remedy. The ability to grant an injunction, for example, only rests with decision makers that have inherent jurisdiction. Since a
tribunal is statutory, it does not already have the ability to grant injunctions, and
so does not have jurisdiction to give an injunction under section 24(1) of the
Charter. To say that, however, is quite different from saying that an injunction
should not be granted because any harm caused can be adequately compensated
by damages. The first statement concerns the power to grant an injunction at all,
while the second deals with the criteria for granting one.
Think now about the two remedies sought by the applicant in this case: an absolute discharge and a particular treatment order. The latter remedy is not within
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the jurisdiction of the Board at all.1 It is therefore equivalent to asking whether a
tribunal could grant an injunction: it is a remedy which is not available from that
body under any circumstances.
On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the former remedy, an absolute
discharge. The Board does have the authority to grant absolute discharges. To be
sure, among the criteria for granting them is the question of whether the applicant is dangerous; however, that is a criterion to use in deciding whether to grant
a remedy which is, in principle, in its jurisdiction.
The potential trouble with Conway is that that is not the way the Court deals
with the issue. Rather, they merge the existence of the remedy and the criteria
for granting the remedy into a single question; they conclude that the Board does
not have jurisdiction to grant "an absolute discharge to an NCR patient found to
be dangerous."2 Because Conway's application for an absolute discharge would
not succeed, the Court holds, the Board does not have jurisdiction over the remedy at all. This seems to incorrectly mingle what should be two distinct
questions.
The difficulty with this as an approach, and the reason it potentially leads to
diminution of Charter jurisdiction, is that it renders Charter remedies largely
redundant. If an applicant can succeed in obtaining the remedy under the ordinary rules of the statute (because the criteria are met), then the Charter remedy
is not needed. If an applicant cannot succeed in obtaining the remedy under the
ordinary rules of the statute (because the criteria are not met), then the Charter
remedy is not available. In either case the Charter becomes irrelevant.
This approach makes the ability of a tribunal to grant a remedy under its Charter
jurisdiction coextensive with its ability to grant that same remedy without the
Charter. Indeed, the Court seems to acknowledge this point, in noting that "Mr.
Conway admits that these remedies are outside the Board's statutory jurisdiction, but asserts that s. 24( 1) of the Charter frees the Board from statutory limits
on its jurisdiction" and replying "I disagree."3 If the purpose of bringing an application for a Charter remedy is not to gain access to remedies in circumstances
where the normal statutory limits are not governing, however, then it is difficult
to know why one would bring the Charter application at all.
This point could be looked at in a slightly different way. On the facts of this
case, it would be easy to think that Conway should not receive an absolute discharge under section 24(1), precisely because it would be unreasonable to re-
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lease someone who had been found to be dangerous. That is, he could be eligible
for a remedy under section 24(1) and yet it not be the case that a discharge was
the remedy which was appropriate and just. That is not the same as saying that
there is no jurisdiction to grant the remedy of an absolute discharge. The Court
seems to state both of these conclusions in a single paragraph, however, not
acknowledging the difference between them:
The Board's duty to protect public safety, its statutory authority to grant absolute discharges only to non dangerous NCR patients, and its mandate to
assess and treat NCR patients with a view to reintegration rather than recidivism, all point to Parliament's intent not to permit NCR patients who are
dangerous to have access to absolute discharges as a remedy. These factors
are determinative in this case and lead to the conclusion that it would not be
appropriate and just in Mr. Conway's current circumstances for the Board to
grant him an absolute discharge.

The potential result of Conway, therefore, is a shrinking of the Charter jurisdiction of tribunals. This does not have to be the case, and certainly was not the
intended result. A rule that a body with the ability to decide questions of law has
the ability to grant any Charter remedies which are not expressly or impliedly
removed from it could be very expansive, which seemingly was the intention
motivating the Court. However, if the analysis of whether a particular Charter
remedy is available routinely follows the approach taken here, and merges the
criteria for granting a remedy with the existence of the remedy itself, then Conway is unlikely to bring about its intended effect.
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